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Abstract
We explore failures of purchasing power parity across European cities, attempting to move
beyond a “first-generation” of papers that document very large border effects.  We document two very
distinct types of border effects embedded in relative prices.  The first is a “real barriers effect”, caused
by various barriers to trade.  The second is a sticky-consumer-price cum volatile exchange-rate effect.
Both are shown to be important empirically, the second type especially so.  We argue that the two
effects are very different from each other.  For the first type of effect, the larger is the border effect the
larger is the deadweight welfare loss.  But for the second type of effect the issue is not so clear.  While
the existence of a border effect of the second type does imply economic distortions, it is not necessarily
true, comparing two border effects across two pairs of countries, that a larger border effect of this type
implies a larger deadweight welfare loss.
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A spate of recent research has improved our understanding of the size, sources, and
implications of the well-documented deviations from the law of one price internationally (Isard, 1977).
Concerning size, one strand of the literature performs variance decompositions of real exchange rates.
These studies find that in mature economies law of one price deviations are responsible for most of the
variance of real exchange rates.
1  Another strategy has been to compare movements in goods prices
across national borders to price movements between different regions within a country.  Engel and
Rogers (1996) demonstrate that prices of similar goods between U.S. and Canadian cities are
systematically more variable than prices between equi-distant cities in the same country.  By this
“width of the border” metric, international failures of the law of one price are large.  The Engel-Rogers
finding is consistent with other research showing that goods, labor, and capital flow more readily
between regions within a country than across borders (see McCallum, 1995 and papers in the volume
edited by Hess and Van Wincoop, 1999).
Several insights have also been brought to bear on the possible sources of these failures of the
law of one price.  The potential sources include tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, transportation
costs, non-traded inputs such as marketing and other distribution services that are a part of final goods
prices, and variable nominal exchange rates under sticky prices.  One explanation of this last source is
that exporters "price to market".  That is, producers selling abroad set prices in the consumers' currency
rather than its own.  Under local currency pricing (LCP), changes in nominal exchange rates do not
affect goods prices in the local market, i.e., there is zero pass-through of exchange rate changes.
Several papers present evidence of local currency pricing, including Giovannini (1988), Marston
(1990), and Knetter (1993).  Feenstra and Kendall (1997) find that a significant portion of observed
deviations from purchasing power parity is attributable to incomplete exchange rate pass-through as a
result of local currency pricing.  Our results are consistent with Feenstra and Kendall's.
Interest in the extent to which local currency pricing can account for empirical failures of the
law of one price has surged for two related reasons.  First, with the launching of the Euro on January 1,
1999 the currencies of European Monetary Union members became irrevocably fixed on their way
toward eventually disappearing from circulation.  Across the Atlantic, advocates of a "dollar bloc"
have recently proposed that some combination of Argentina, Mexico and Canada relinquish their
national currencies and adopt the U.S. dollar.  This would replace current arrangements that have
produced different degrees of exchange rate flexibility, as did EMU. There have also been calls for a
Japanese yen bloc in Asia.  Deviations from the law of one price would be reduced under such unified
currency blocs if local currency pricing is indeed a significant factor.
Second, several recent theoretical papers have argued that assumptions concerning price-setting
behavior can affect debate about the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rate systems.  Engel
(1998) and Devereux and Engel (1998) point out that traditional arguments in favor of floating rates all
assume producer-currency pricing (PCP), where prices are set in the currency of the producer.  Under
PCP, prices faced by consumers in an export market fluctuate with changes in the nominal exchange
rate, so that there is complete pass-through of exchange rates to domestic prices; but, under local-
currency pricing (LCP), prices are set in the currency of the consumer and there is zero pass-through of
exchange rates to local prices.  Tille (1998) and Bachetta and Van Wincoop (1999) also consider price-
setting of this form, in dynamic general-equilibrium optimizing models, and highlight the role of
deviations from the law of one price that result from different forms of price determination.
                                               
1 Rogers and Jenkins (1995) and Engel (1999).  A related literature is on purchasing power parity; see Rogoff (1996).2
In this paper we undertake an empirical exploration of failures of the law of one price across
European cities.  Our principal focus is the role of local currency pricing and floating exchange rates in
accounting for international failures of the law of one price.  In Engel and Rogers (1996) we suggest
that local currency pricing may be an important factor in explaining the large border effect in consumer
price data from U.S. and Canadian cities.  The present study is a much more direct examination of
local currency pricing than the earlier paper.  Using the framework of Devereux and Engel, we derive
an expression for the variance of relative prices across locations in terms of the variance of nominal
exchange rates and transportation costs.  We use this model for two purposes.  First, it motivates our
regressions.  In section III, we investigate the determinants of the volatility of real exchange rates
among cities in Europe. We derive an expression that relates real exchange rate volatility to the
volatility of nominal exchange rates, and to factors that influence transportation costs.  That expression
is very similar to the equations estimated in Engel and Rogers (1996), and is the basis for our
regressions of section III.
We estimate this equation using consumer price data from European cities in 11 countries over
the period 1981-97.  The European data set has many advantages over that used in our earlier work.
The Engel-Rogers (1996) data set consists of observations from U.S. and Canadian cities only.  There
is no distinction between the empirically-important border dummy (unity for city pairs lying across the
border) and a measure of nominal exchange rate variability, since all cross-border pairs have the same
nominal exchange rate.  In the European data set we have city price data from several countries, and
hence are able to include both a border dummy variable and a measure of nominal exchange rate
variability in a regression explaining the variability of (common-currency) prices across cities.  This
allows us to assess the role of local currency pricing and variable nominal exchange rates directly
rather than having to rely on the indirect methods used in Engel and Rogers (1996).  Our results
indicate that most of the failures of the law of one price are attributable to local-currency pricing, but
transportation costs and other barriers are also important explanatory factors.  We find that, even
taking into account nominal exchange rate variability, the border continues to have a positive and
significant effect on real exchange rate variability.  However, these effects are small compared to the
local currency pricing effect.
The other purpose of our model is to explore the welfare implications of our empirical findings.
Devereux and Engel (1998) explore this issue extensively and methodically, but here we focus on a
particular misconception about fixed exchange rates.  When nominal prices are sticky in consumers’
currencies, then nominal exchange rate fluctuations can lead to severe misalignment of goods prices
between countries.  There is an inefficiency since consumers in different countries pay different prices
for the same good.  One may be tempted to infer from our regressions that fixed exchange rates are
more desirable than floating rates on the grounds that price deviations across borders are minimized,
thus minimizing this inefficiency.  This logic is not entirely correct. As in Devereux and Engel, under
floating exchange rates and local-currency pricing, there is an economic inefficiency that results from
consumers paying different prices in the two locations, even when transportation costs are zero. The
law of one price holds if exchange rates are fixed and transport costs are zero, so that inefficiency is
eliminated under fixed exchange rates.  Even so, fixed exchange rates do not necessarily increase
welfare because fixed rates increase aggregate risk by increasing swings in world income.  Thus, even
if the welfare losses from failures of the law of one price were eliminated by fixing exchange rates, this
is not necessarily welfare-improving.  The inefficiency (and hence the welfare loss) is due to price
stickiness, and the choice of the exchange rate regime does not necessarily alter that.  This analysis is
undertaken in section IV.3
The paper attempts to move beyond the above-mentioned research that made the important
contribution of documenting a “border” effect.  Our main point is that there are two very distinct types
of border effects embedded in relative prices.  One is a sort of “real barriers effect”, caused by various
barriers to trade.  It is analogous to the border effects in the trade volume literature [e.g., McCallum
(1995) and Helliwell (1996)].  This effect appears to be empirically significant in our European data
set.  The second is a sticky-consumer-price cum volatile exchange-rate effect.  It is even more
important empirically.  For the first effect, it is clear that the larger the border effect the larger the
deadweight welfare loss.  The second effect is not so clear.  While the existence of a border effect of
the second type does imply economic distortions, it is not necessarily true, comparing two border
effects across two pairs of countries, that a larger border effect of this type implies a larger deadweight
welfare loss.
I.  Data
We use consumer price indexes from 55 locations in Europe.
2  The data are monthly, covering
the period March 1981 to July 1997.  Table 1 lists the locations.  Notice that these span eleven
countries.  In four cases, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, this includes price data from
different locations within the country.  The German data were obtained from the statistical offices of
the individual Lander (state).  The Italian data come from regular publications of the official
government statistical agency ISTAT.  For Spain, the data are on-line in the monthly statistical bulletin
of Spain’s national statistical institute INE, while the Federal Office for Statistics provided the data for
Switzerland.  We also use the CPI for Paris, which we obtained from the database of the Bank for
International Settlements.  For the other six countries--Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and Portugal--we were unable to obtain data from cities within the country.  We rely on
the national CPIs in those cases.  These data were taken from the IMFs International Financial
Statistics database, as were the nominal exchange rates used in the study.
Using price indexes from these 55 locations, we construct 1485 (=55 x 54/2) bilateral relative
prices.  In addition, our sample of eleven countries implies that the cross-border location pairs lie
across one of 55 (=11 x 10/2) national borders (that are not necessarily adjacent).
There are a variety of arrangements determining the nominal exchange rates of our 55 country-
pairs.  Belgium and Luxembourg share a common currency.  Germany was at the heart of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System, and so had a formal policy of
fixed exchange rates with France, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
during the sample.  Each of these countries was included in the first wave of entrants into the Euro,
launched just after our sample ends.  In contrast, Italy was a member of the ERM until 1992 (and later
re-joined), while Spain and Portugal joined the ERM in 1994.  There is also some variety in countries’
participation in the free-trade area, the European Union (EU).  Switzerland has remained out of any
formal arrangements on either exchange rates or trade, while Spain and Portugal are relatively recent
                                               
2 Price data at a less aggregated level is not available on a comparable basis across these locations.  Engel (1999) shows that
essentially all of the variability in relative CPIs across countries is due to variability in traded-goods prices across countries,
rather than variability in the ratio of non-traded to traded goods prices within countries.4
members of the EU, joining in the mid-eighties.  All other countries were members at the beginning of
our sample in 1981.
Related to these differences in formal participation in exchange rate arrangements are the
different inflation performance of these countries.  As seen from Table 1, average annual inflation rates
range from 13 percent in Portugal, nearly 8 percent in Italy and Spain, to 3 percent or under in
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.  In spite of these cross-country differences in the period
averages, the inflation rates of all countries converged noticeably over the sample, so that by 1996
inflation was less than 4 percent everywhere.
The eleven countries used in this study also differ along geographic, linguistic, and cultural
lines.  Germany, lying at the geographic center of Europe, shares a common border with seven of the
other countries.  On the other hand, Portugal and Denmark lie at the extremes, and share a common
border with only one other country in the sample.  We take explicit account of geographic
considerations such as common border, as well as physical distance between locations.  Finally,
although languages are common to some extent across all countries, French and German are spoken in
a relatively large number of countries in the sample, while Portuguese is rather specific to Portugal.
These factors contribute, in varying degrees, to the openness of the countries.  The final column of
Table 1 displays one measure of openness, the imports-to-GDP ratio.  These range from above ninety
percent for Luxembourg to the low twenties for Italy, France, and Spain.
Relative Prices: Summary Statistics
Denote the log of the CPI in location j relative to that in location k as P(j,k).  All prices are
denominated in U.S. dollars.  We are interested in explaining the volatility of changes in P(j,k).  We
consider one-month changes in relative prices,  ) , ( k j P D , but also examine the robustness of our results
to using 12-month differences.  We measure volatility as the variance.
3
We construct a measure of volatility for each of our 1485 location-pairs.  The analysis is then
based on the cross-section of 1485 volatility measures.  Table 2 presents summary statistics.  The first
row reports averages for all pairs of locations.  In the rows that follow, we report averages for pairs of
locations that are (i) both within Germany, (ii) both within Italy, (iii) both within Spain, (iv) both
within Switzerland, (v) both within the same country (labeled intra-national), and (vi) one in one
country and one in a foreign country (labeled inter-national).
The first column of Table 2 reports the average variance of  ) , ( k j P D , for three different
horizons, 1-month, 12-months, and 48-months.  For 1-month changes, the average volatility of cross-
border pairs is 2.76, more than sixteen times larger than the average variance of within-country pairs,
0.17.  The within-Germany pairs exhibit the lowest average volatility, followed in order by those of
Switzerland, Italy, and Spain.  But even the volatility of relative price changes across Spanish cities,
equal to 0.23, is considerably lower than the average volatility of the cross-border pairs.  At longer
horizons, we observe a similar pattern: cross-border relative price changes are more volatile that intra-
national price changes by at least an order of magnitude.
                                               
3  In past work, we have looked at the robustness to using root mean squared errors as an alternative measure of volatility.
Because the drifts in relative price changes are all near zero, the results are essentially identical to those using variances.5
The next column reports the volatility of nominal exchange rate changes,  ) , ( k j s D , again for
horizons of 1-months, 12-months, and 48 months.  For cross-border pairs, nominal exchange rate
variability is practically identical to relative price variability, a result that is well established in the
literature.  For example, at the 48-month horizon the average volatility of cross-border relative price
changes is 159.8, while the average volatility of nominal exchange rate changes is 159.0.  As seen in
the next column, which reports the average distance between locations, we also see that cross-border
pairs are typically more distant than the within-country pairs.  In order to sort out the relative influence
of these factors, we examine the regression evidence.
Regression Specifications
In the rest of the paper we present the results of our attempt to explain  )) , ( ( k j P V D , the
variance of  ) , ( k j P D .  We estimate regressions of the form:
å + + + + = D ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )) , ( (
2
2 1 k j u X k j r k j r m D m k j P V q b b a
where D(m) is a dummy variable for each city in our sample, r(j,k) is the distance between cities j and
k, and X is a vector of explanatory variables that differ across different specifications. Our approach is
not standard, in that we do not attempt to explain real exchange rate movements as arising from real
demand and supply factors that alter relative prices of different goods (such as the price of tradable to
non-traded goods.)  Our earlier empirical studies (Engel (1993, 1999), Rogers and Jenkins (1995) and
Engel and Rogers (1996)) strongly demonstrate the predominance of deviations from the law of one
price in accounting for movements in real exchange rates, at least among industrialized countries.  So,
in our model, time-varying deviations from the law of one price drive real exchange rate movements.
We abstract from any of the traditional explanations that rely on changes in relative supply and
demand for goods and services.  Before describing the results, we show in the next section how to
derive this regression equation from a theoretical model of local currency pricing.
II.  A Model of Deviations from the Law of One Price
We present a simple extension of the model of Devereux and Engel (1998).  The representative



















s s L P











1 1 ,      0 > r6















We assume that there are n identical individuals in the home country,  1 0 < < n .  Ch and Cf are Dixit-
Stiglitz constant-elasticity-of–substitution indexes over consumption of goods produced at home and in
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The elasticity of substitution between goods produced within a country is l , which we assume to be
greater than 1.  There is a unit elasticity of substitution between the home goods and foreign goods
indexes.   P
M  are domestic real balances, and L is the labor supply of the representative home agent.
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There are  n - 1  identical individuals in the foreign country, with preferences similar to home country
residents.  The terms in the utility function involving consumption are identical in the home and
foreign countries.  The functional form for real balances and labor are the same as for home country
residents, but for foreign residents they are functions of foreign real balances and foreign labor supply.
We assume complete asset markets.  Specifically, residents of each country can purchase state-
contingent nominal bonds.  The government increases the money supply with direct transfers.  There is
no government spending or taxes.  The Appendix gives details of the money supply processes.
Firms are monopolistic.  Firm i in the home country sells  ) (i nCht  of its product to home-
country residents in period t and  ) ( ) 1 (
* i C n ht -  to the foreign consumers.  We assume that each unit of
output sold to home residents requires  ) ( 1 i kt +  units of labor, where  ) (i kt  is an i.i.d. random variable,
with mean k  (which is the same for all i).   ) (i kt  is distributed independently of  ) ( j kt ,  j i ¹ .  One
                                               
4 This utility function is the special case of that examined in Devereux and Engel (1998). This special case is useful
because it allows closed-form solutions of the model with no approximations.  It leads to some implications in this model
that are not entirely satisfying: nominal interest rates are constant in equilibrium, and wages are equalized across countries.
But, the model is simplified enough that it allows us to explain some of the welfare issues much more clearly.7
unit of output sold to foreigners requires  ) ( 1
* i kt +  units of labor to produce, where  ) (
* i kt  is also an
i.i.d. random variable, with mean 
* k , and  ) (
* i kt  is distributed independently of  ) (
* j kt ,  j i ¹ .
We can think of  ) (i kt  and  ) (
* i kt  as incorporating “iceberg” transportation costs.  Under that
interpretation, it takes one unit of labor to produce goods for sale to either home or foreign residents.




 of the good arrives when it is shipped to home country residents, and
only a fraction 
) ( 1
1
* i kt +
 arrives when the good is shipped abroad.  We assume that the mean cost of
shipping abroad is greater than the mean cost of shipping domestically, so  k k >
* .  The prices that
consumers pay are for the delivered good, so the producer bears the cost of shipping (which, of course,
is incorporated in the price.)
We assume that prices must be set one period in advance.  Firms set a price in domestic
currency terms for home residents and in foreign currency for foreign consumers.  Firms face a
competitive labor market, and are wage-takers.  Firm managers maximize the expected utility of firm
owners.  We assume that domestic residents own domestic firms.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) show
that, given there is no real intertemporal dimension to the firms’ decisions, the optimization problem
reduces to choosing  ) (i Pht  and  ) (
* i Pht  to maximize expected profits next period discounted by a utility-
based discount factor:
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Foreign firms face a similar optimization problem, choosing  ) (i Pft  and  ) (
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The Appendix derives the solutions to the optimization problems of consumers and managers,
















































k k m t t t t n n m p .( 6 )
where




1 i k E t t t - - + = k .
Lower-case letters represent the natural logs of their upper-case counterparts.  Note that  1 - t k  and 
*
1 - t k
are assumed to be independent of the specific firm.  We assume  1
*
1 - - > t t k k , so the home country price
index will be higher the greater the proportion of goods is imported.
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 582-583; 1998, p. 38-40) have shown, when the money
supply follows a random walk and real balances enter the utility function logarithmically (as we have
assumed), the nominal interest rate will be constant.  In this model, an increase in the home money
supply will lower real interest rates but increase expected inflation.  The two effects exactly offset, so
the nominal interest rate does not change.  With nominal interest rates constant, and uncovered interest
parity holding up to a constant, the expected change in the log of the exchange rate must be a constant.
The log of the exchange rate follows a random walk.  As discussed in the Appendix, we assume that
money supplies also follow a random walk; thus, money is expected to be neutral after prices adjust in
one period.  So, a one-percent increase in the home money supply today is expected to lead to a one-
percent depreciation of the currency next period.  But, given the random walk behavior of exchange
rates, this implies the current exchange rate rises one percent.  There is no overshooting of exchange
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From equations (5)-(7) we can derive the following expression for the real exchange rate:
) ln( ) (
1
) )( 2 1 (
* 2 2 *
1 1 1
*
* m m s s
r
k k + - + - - + - = - + º - - - m m t t t t t t t t n s s p p s q .( 8 )
The variance of the change in the real exchange rate is given by:




- - - D - + D = D t t t t Var n s Var q Var k k ,( 9 )
where D  is the first-difference operator.
The effect of the variance of the nominal exchange rate on the real exchange rate is magnified
by a factor of two.  This occurs because prices adjust fully in one period.  The variance of the real
exchange rate in period t is affected one-for-one by the variance of the nominal exchange rate in period
t because prices are preset (in period t-1) and do not respond to exchange-rate shocks.  But, prices in
period t adjust completely to period t-1 monetary shocks, so period t-1 exchange rate changes are
reflected one-for-one in period t prices.  In the real world, prices adjust more slowly.  So, we would not
expect the real exchange-rate variance to magnify the nominal exchange-rate variance so much.9
Actual changes in transportation costs do not affect prices, only changes in the conditional
expectations of transportation costs.  That is because prices are preset, so producers cannot adjust
prices in response to shocks to transport costs.  In equation (9), if the countries are of equal size
( 2
1 = n ), these costs do not appear at all.  The greater the share of the consumer basket that is imported,
the higher the price of that basket because imported goods incorporate higher transportation costs.  But
when countries are of equal size, these costs affect price levels equally in both countries.
III.  Regressions
As noted above, we estimate regressions of the form:
å + + + + = D ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )) , ( (
2
2 1 k j u X k j r k j r m D m k j P V q b b a (10)
where D(m) is a dummy variable for each city in our sample, r(j,k) is the distance between cities j and
k, and X is a vector of explanatory variables that differ across different specifications.  Note that all
regressions are cross-sectional, with 1485 observations.  The inclusion of separate dummies for each
individual location allows the variance of price changes to vary from city to city.  One reason for this
comes from Table 2, which indicates somewhat higher average volatility for Spanish and Italian cities
than German or Swiss cities.  This could be because Spain, for example, is a relatively heterogenous
country.  Spain’s labor markets or goods markets may be less integrated than those of Switzerland, so
there can be greater discrepancies in prices between cities in Spain.  Aggregate supply shocks may
vary more across cities in Spain and Italy than Switzerland.  Alternatively, there may be differences
across countries in methodologies for gathering price data that lead to greater discrepancies in prices
between locations in one country than another.
We use a couple of measures to proxy for the variation in expected transport costs.  First, we
hypothesize that this variance will be larger the greater the distance between locations. As in the
gravity model of trade, we postulate a concave relationship between distance and relative price
volatility, and so expect that  0 1 > b and 0 2 < b .
5  We interpret “transportation costs” liberally to
include any factors that make it more costly to sell in one location compared to another.  For example,
there may be trade barriers between countries.  A large portion of the cost that consumers pay is for the
marketing and distribution of the good.  Producers may find it more costly to market in locations that
are distant from where the production takes place and corporate decisions are made.  Likewise,
distribution networks may be more difficult to organize and monitor in distant locales.
The variables included in X differ across specifications. We are particularly interested in
whether there is a border effect.  That is, even taking into account distance between two locations, and
                                               
5  We also ran regressions with a logarithmic, rather than quadratic, functional form for distance.  We found log(distance)
to be positive and significant, as we have in our earlier work.10
the nominal exchange rate variance, are there other factors that cause prices in cities in different
countries to vary?  For reasons outlined in the model above, and considering the results of Engel and
Rogers (1996), we expect the variability of prices between cities that lie across a border to be higher
than those between cities within a country, even after accounting for the effect of distance.  Therefore,
we include in X a dummy variable, Border, that takes on a value of unity if cities j and k are in different
countries. This dummy variable may capture some of the formal and informal international barriers to
trade.  We typically find Border to be positive and significant.
One reason the dummy variable Border might be important is because of local currency pricing
by producers, as shown above.  To test this, we include in X the variance of nominal exchange rate
changes between locations j and k,  )) , ( ( k j s V D .  We stress the usefulness of including this variable in
addition to the Border dummy.  This allows us to assess the role of exchange rate variability / sticky
prices directly.  In Engel and Rogers (1996) we had to rely on indirect attempts to assess this channel.
This is because in our earlier data set, where we had observations from U.S. and Canadian cities only,
there is no distinction between the Border dummy variable and nominal exchange rate variability,
since all cross-border pairs have the same nominal exchange rate.  Including both regressors would be
redundant in that data set.  In the current case we have city price data from several countries, and hence
are able to include both Border and  )) , ( ( k j s V D .
There are of course reasons other than sticky prices why the border matters.  Although there are
no formal barriers to trade among most countries in the sample for most of the period (Switzerland is
the exception), there may be informal barriers.  Furthermore, marketing and distribution networks may
be less homogenous across borders than within countries, perhaps in part because a different language
is spoken in the foreign country.  We consider how much of the variance of relative prices continues to
be explained by the Border dummy once we have included nominal exchange rate volatility in the
regression, as well as controls for language and a common border.  Finally, we measure the importance
of each of the several borders in our sample, by including in X individual border dummies (e.g.,
Germany-Italy, Germany-Spain, etc.).
6  The relative sizes of these may provide clues as to why the
border effect is large, and allows us to go beyond what we were able to do in Engel and Rogers (1996).
Regression Results
The first column of Table 3A presents the results of regressing the variance of the 1-month
change in the log relative price on Distance, Distance squared, Border, and 55 individual location
dummies (one for each of our 49 cities and for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
and Portugal).  All coefficients have the anticipated sign and are significant at the 5 percent level.  The
coefficient on the Border dummy is 2.85 with a standard error of 0.06.  The interpretation of this
coefficient is the difference between the average variance of relative prices for city pairs that lie across
a border less the average for pairs that lie within a country, taking into account the effect of distance
and city-specific characteristics.  The positive and significant estimated Border effect confirms the
results for the U.S. and Canada documented by Engel and Rogers (1996): crossing an international
border adds considerable volatility to relative city prices, even after accounting for the effects of
distance and city-specific characteristics.
                                               
6  This necessitates dropping both Border and V(D(s(j,k))).11
There are many possible explanations for the strong border effect, one of which emphasizes the
role of local currency pricing in a world of variable nominal exchange rates.  Specification 2 adds to
the regression the variability of one-month nominal exchange rate changes, which of course is zero for
all intra-national pairs.  An implication of the theoretical model above, which assumes complete local
currency pricing and full price adjustment after one period, is that this coefficient should be 2.00.
7  In
the real world prices adjust more slowly than one period (month), of course, leading us to expect the
coefficient to be less than 2.0, but with complete local currency pricing it will still be greater than 1.00.
For our sample, the coefficient on nominal exchange rate variability is 0.92.  The fact that this is
significantly less than unity (the standard error is 0.005) suggests that there is not complete local
currency pricing (irrespective of the length of nominal price stickiness), as local prices respond
somewhat to exchange rate changes.
Although nominal exchange rate variability does not magnify real exchange rate variability by
as much as our model of local currency pricing implies, the addition of  )) , ( ( k j s V D  substantially
weakens the effect of the Border dummy, whose point estimate falls from 2.85 in specification 1 to
0.21 in specification 2.   This suggests that a very large part of the border effect is from variable
nominal exchange rates under sticky prices.  However, even with  )) , ( ( k j s V D  in the regression, the
Border dummy remains positive and significant with a t-statistic exceeding 10.  In specification 3, we
add two dummies variables, Adjacent, which is unity if there is a common border separating the city
pair and Language, which is unity if the cities lie in different countries that speak a common language.
We hypothesize that each of these dummies will be negatively related to relative price variability.  As
seen in Table 3A, the adjacency dummy is negative and significant, while Language is insignificant.
There is very little effect on the rest of the estimated coefficient.
Specification 4 replaces the variance of the nominal exchange rate and the Border, Adjacency,
and Language dummies with individual dummies for each border (Germany-Italy, Germany-Spain, ...,
Netherlands-Portugal), of which there are 55 in our sample.
8  Distance and distance squared remain of
the expected sign and are significant in this specification.  We also report the 5 largest and smallest of
the 55 estimated individual border dummies.  The smallest are Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany-
Austria, Germany-Netherlands, Austria-Netherlands, and Denmark-Luxembourg.  The largest are
Italy-Switzerland, Spain-Switzerland, Switzerland-Portugal, Italy-Portugal, and Italy-Luxembourg.
Notice that the largest border coefficient, 3.98 for Italy-Switzerland, is nearly 40 times larger than the
smallest (0.11 for Belgium-Luxembourg).
What explains the relative sizes of these individual border effects?  Nominal exchange rate
variability certainly comes to mind, but there are other possibilities.  Even in our pre-Euro sample
period, Belgium and Luxembourg shared a common currency and so have had zero nominal exchange
rate variability.  The currencies of Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands were tied together relatively
                                               
7  Under the assumptions of complete local currency pricing and full price adjustment after one period, nominal exchange
rates, st, and relative prices (p - p
*) are uncorrelated but have equal unconditional variances.  Thus, in a regression
explaining the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of real exchange rates, (s - p + p*), the coefficient on the volatility
of nominal exchange rates exceeds unity.
8  With n=11 countries, there are [n*(n-1)/2]=55 individual border dummies.12
closely.  This may not be everything, however.  According to Table 1, Belgium and Luxembourg are
the two most open countries in our sample, as measured by imports-to-GDP ratio.  Also, in the latter
three countries, German is a commonly-spoken language; these three are also likely to experience
similar supply shocks due to their geographic proximity and the similarity of their economic bases.  At
the other extreme, all five of the largest border dummies involve Italy and/or Switzerland.  Switzerland
is the only country in our sample that is not a member of the free-trade EU area.  In addition,
Switzerland did not participate in the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS (nor is it a prospective
EMU member) and so has experienced relatively large fluctuations in the value of its currency.
Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the estimated border coefficients against the variance of the
nominal exchange rate.  The tight, positive relationship that is evident from the plot confirms our
earlier evidence on the importance of nominal exchange rate variability.
Figure 2 plots the border coefficients against a frequently-used measure of openness to trade,
the average imports-to-GDP ratio of the two countries.  Table 1 lists this ratio for each country in the
sample.  Note that this measure only partially coincides with a priori beliefs about the degree of
barriers to bilateral trade.  For example, trade between France and Italy, two original members of the
European Union, is by all accounts more open than trade between Portugal and Switzerland.  But, the
trade openness measure for the France-Italy pair is .21, which is less than the value of .365 for
Switzerland-Portugal.  Because things such as geographical factors are important in determining a
country’s import/GDP ratio above and beyond the influence of formal trade barriers, one should think
of the horizontal axis in Figure 2 as reflecting how open the economies are on average.
9  O c u l a r
inspection reveals some evidence of a negative relationship between the size of the border effect and
the imports/GDP ratio, but one that is not nearly as tight as in Figure 1.
The three specifications in Table 3B repeat the regressions of specifications 1, 3 and 4, but
using 48-month changes instead of one-month changes in relative prices and exchange rates.  The
effects of the Border dummy and nominal exchange rate variability are comparable to those reported in
the earlier specifications.  However, distance becomes slightly less significant.  For example, in
specification 2 distance is insignificantly different from zero in the case of the 48-month changes, but
has a t-statistic of around five in the one-month case.  This result is interesting because it suggests that
the effects of transportation costs, and not those of local currency pricing, tend to diminish at longer
horizons (to the extent that distance proxies for transportation costs).
Analysis of the Sub-Periods
The results so far were all computed over the full sample period, 1981:3-1997:7.  Table 4
presents summary statistics for three different sub-periods: 1981:3-86:12, 1987:12-92:7, and 1992:11-
97:7, and regression results for the 1987:12-92:7 sub-period.  The sub-periods correspond roughly to
the changing fortunes of the ERM.  The so-called Hard-EMS period began in 1987 after some
                                               
9  There are alternatives to using the imports-to-GDP ratio in our calculation of trade openness.  Direct measures of trade
barriers are periodically compiled by the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  These
country-wide measures are constructed using, e.g., the average tariff rate or the percentage of goods which are subjected to
some type of non-tariff barrier.  Also, Harrigan (1996) presents model-based estimates of openness in manufacturing trade
among OECD nations.  The fact that Switzerland is not included in Harrigan’s group of countries makes his measures
unusable for us.13
turbulence in foreign exchange markets in the early to mid-1980s.  This period witnessed no re-
alignments of official parities.  However, the general calm in the foreign exchange market was broken
abruptly in September 1992, when the U.K. and Italy withdrew from the ERM.
The first panel of Table 4 presents the average  )) , ( ( k j P V D  and  )) , ( ( k j s V D  for the three sub-
periods and the full sample.  The variability of relative price changes for within-country pairs falls
noticeably across the sub-periods.  The average for all intra-national pairs, for example, falls from 0.22
in the pre-1987 sub-period to 0.16 in the Hard-EMS period, to 0.07 post-1992.  This decline is
evidence of increased economic integration within countries, which is likely to be caused by
advancements in transportation, communication, etc.  Despite the apparent increased integration within
countries, there is no tendency toward increased convergence of inter-national relative prices, as
indicated by the average variances of 2.30, 1.06, and 3.65 for the three sub-periods.  Instead, this
pattern follows that of nominal exchange rate variability, as displayed in the final columns of the panel.
The average variance of the nominal exchange rate change for our three sub-periods is 2.18, 0.71, and
3.62.  This prompts the question: are the factors leading to increased intra-national integration not at
work at the international level or is it simply that greater exchange rate variability masks what is
otherwise a tendency toward increased international integration?
We present some evidence on this in the bottom panel of Table 4, which presents regression
results for the Hard-EMS sub-period.  We choose this period since it is associated with significantly
lower variability in nominal exchange rates.  We repeat specifications 1, 2, and 4 from Table 3A.
Distance is notably smaller and less significant than in the full sample.  The estimated Border
coefficient is still positive and significant, but is only about one-third its size of the full sample
regressions.  This suggests that the forces leading to greater market integration of different regions
within countries are at work to an even greater extent between countries.  Interestingly, the coefficient
on  )) , ( ( k j s V D  is significantly greater than 1.00, at 1.24.  Finally, the individual Border effects shown
in specification 3 are considerably smaller than in the full sample.
IV.  Welfare implications of exchange-rate arrangements
The derivation of the welfare expressions in the Appendix (equation (A.20)) does not rely on
any assumption about the correlation of home money shocks with foreign money shocks.  Expected
utility depends on the variance of home and foreign money shocks, but not on their correlation.  One
implication is that if we compare utility under floating in the symmetric case (in which the variance of
home and foreign money supplies are equal) to utility under fixed exchange rates (in which the home
money supply is perfectly correlated with the foreign money supply) the welfare comparison depends
only on the degree of monetary variance under the two systems.  If money supply shocks have the
same variance under fixed and floating exchange rates, then welfare is equal under the two exchange-
rate systems.
This result definitely depends on some special assumptions we have made here.  Our utility
function is a special case of the more general formulation in Devereux and Engel (1998).  That paper
showed that floating rates dominate fixed rates in welfare terms when monetary variances are equal in
the two regimes.  Van Wincoop and Bacchetta (1999) have even more general welfare functions in a14
two-period model of local-currency pricing, and find the welfare comparisons can go in favor of either
fixed exchange rates or floating rates.
But this simple model is perfect for illustrating a point we wish to emphasize.  Under floating
exchange rates and local-currency pricing, there is clearly an economic inefficiency because consumers
are paying different prices in the two locations even when transportation costs are zero.  The law of
one price holds if exchange rates are fixed and transport costs are zero, so that inefficiency is
eliminated under fixed rates.  Even so, fixed exchange rates do not necessarily increase welfare.
Intuitively, under floating exchange rates expected utility is diminished because of the pricing
inefficiency.  Since residents in different locations face different prices under some states, there is
idiosyncratic risk in equilibrium.  The risk-sharing condition, equation (4), is identical to the condition
derived by Backus and Smith (1993) in their model with non-traded goods.  Aggregate consumption
levels are not equalized in all states because consumers face different aggregate price levels.  Under
fixed exchange rates in this model (with no transport costs), the law of one price holds and
idiosyncratic risk is eliminated in equilibrium.  Equation (4) shows that when the law of one price
(and, hence, purchasing power parity) holds, consumption is equal at home and abroad in all states.
But, fixed exchange rates increase aggregate risk.  Monetary policies at home and abroad are perfectly
correlated under fixed exchange rates.  Since, in sticky-price models, swings in the money supply
affect output, swings in world income are enhanced under fixed exchange rates.  The trade-off, then, is
that fixed exchange rates eliminate idiosyncratic risk at the cost of increasing aggregate risk.  In this
model, those two effects exactly cancel (if the monetary variances are the same under fixed and
floating), so welfare is the same under the two exchange-rate systems.
As we discussed above, in equilibrium, nominal interest rates are constant.  From equation
(A.12), we get
) 1 ln( c
mb r - + - = t t t p m c . (11)
We note from equation (5) that the price level depends not only on the level of the money
supply and the expected cost shocks, but also on the variance of the money supply.  As the recent
literature has explained (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and
Devereux and Engel (1998)), the variance of the money supply affects the level of prices through the
risk aversion of firm-owners.  Firm managers must take into account the risk aversion of firm owners
in setting prices.  Monetary variance increases the variance of consumption in sticky-price models, and
so enters the firm’s pricing decisions.  However, the price level does not depend on the correlation of
the money shocks, and so is the same under fixed and floating exchange rates.  The mean and variance
of home consumption is related only to the mean and variance of home money supply, and similarly
for foreign consumption and foreign money.  The independence of real consumption from the
exchange-rate regime recalls Baxter and Stockman’s (1989) empirical study that showed that the
volatility of many real economic variables (including consumption) do not depend on the volatility of
real exchange rates.
Suppose money (and therefore consumption) in each country could take on only two values,
high (H) and low (L).  Under floating exchange rates, let us suppose there are four possible states, each15
equally likely.  State 1 is H-H (that is high home consumption, high foreign consumption).  State 2 is
H-L; state 3 is L-H; and, state 4 is L-L.  Given that the exchange rate is just proportional to the money
supplies (equation (11)), in states 1 and 4 the law of one price holds even though prices are preset.  But
in states 2 and 3, there are deviations from the law of one price.  In those states, a planner could
reallocate goods to improve worldwide welfare in the Pareto sense.
Now, suppose under fixed exchange rates the home country alters its money supply to equal the
foreign money supply in all states.  So, state 1 is H-H; state 2 is L-L; state 3 is H-H; and, state 4 is L-L.
There is no change in the allocations in states 1 and 4.  But now in states 2 and 3 the money supplies
and consumption levels are equal, and the law of one price holds.  Has welfare been improved?
Clearly not (at least from looking at the consumption part of the utility function.)  The mean and
variance of consumption in both countries is exactly the same as under floating exchange rates.  There
is no pricing inefficiency under fixed exchange rates, but there is greater variance in world
consumption.
The choice of monetary regime affects the amount of aggregate risk in the economy.  While
fixed exchange rates eliminate the pricing inefficiency (in other words, eliminate the idiosyncratic risk
in states 2 and 3), they increase the variance of aggregate average world consumption.  The underlying
inefficiency here is the stickiness of prices.  That inefficiency cannot be eliminated by the choice of
exchange-rate system.
While the Appendix derives the general expression for welfare in this model, it is convenient to
examine the special case in which  2
1 = n  and 
2 2 2











































) 1 ln( k + = k ,           ) 1 ln(
* * k + = k ,
and k  and 
* k  are the unconditional means of domestic and international transport costs, respectively.
Equation (12) shows that higher transport costs lower welfare.  We expect transport costs
between locations to be greater than transport costs within a location, so  k k >
* .  When transport costs
are greater, the deviations from the law of one price will be greater and there will be lower utility.
However, deviations from the law of one price that occur because prices are preset in
consumers’ currencies and exchange rates respond to current monetary shocks do not necessarily
translate directly into welfare losses.  Equation (12) shows that welfare is lower the greater is the
variance of money supplies.  But this expression holds for any value of the correlation of home and
foreign moneys.  Hence, it is monetary variability, not exchange-rate variability (and the implied
deviations from the law of one price) that lower welfare.  It is easy to show that welfare under flexible16
prices is given by equation (12) with  0
2 = s .  In this model, the welfare loss from sticky prices is
directly related to the variance of money shocks.
This has direct implications for the interpretation of our empirical results.  We find that the
large border effect can be primarily attributed to the volatility of nominal exchange rates.  If the border
effect declines because exchange rates become permanently fixed, that does not necessarily imply that
welfare will increase.  The only clear-cut welfare improvement that accompanies reductions in law of
one price deviations comes from the reduction of real barriers to trade.
It is fair to say that one of the principle motivations for forming the EMU and moving to a
single currency is that member countries hoped that some discipline might be imposed on their own
monetary policies.  If indeed the EMU succeeds in reducing overall monetary variance, then it will
have a beneficial welfare effect.
V. Conclusions
We explore failures of the law of one price across European cities, using consumer price data
from European cities over the period 1981-97.  We attempt to move beyond a “first-generation” of
research papers (by us and others) that empirically document very large border effects.  There are two
very distinct types of border effects embedded in relative prices.  The first type, a “real barriers effect”
caused by various barriers to trade, is analogous to the border effects in the literature on trade volumes.
The second is a sticky-consumer-price cum volatile exchange-rate effect.  Both effects are shown to be
important empirically, the second type especially so.  For the first type of effect, the larger is the
border effect the larger is the deadweight welfare loss.  But for the second type of effect the issue is not
so clear.  While the existence of a border effect of the second type does imply economic distortions, it
is not necessarily true, comparing two border effects across two pairs of countries, that a larger border
effect of this type implies a larger deadweight welfare loss.
We establish this general point through four particular contributions.  First is our empirical
attempt to identify the sources of the large border effects in international comparisons of consumer
prices.  Because of our unique data set on consumer prices from 55 locations across 11 European
countries, we are able to fairly conclusively identify that most of the border effects are coming from
local currency pricing with fluctuating nominal exchange rates.  Our results thus provide support for
the focus on local currency pricing taken in several recent theoretical papers examining the welfare
implications of different exchange rate regimes.
Second, we find that even taking into account nominal exchange rate variability (as well as
language and geographic considerations), the border still has a positive and significant effect on real
exchange rate variability.  However, these effects are small compared to the local currency pricing
effect.  We speculate that the remaining border effect reflects factors like cross-country differences in
the national marketing and distribution systems.  In addition, we confirm earlier finding that distance
and city-specific factors are also significant.
The third contribution of the paper is to show how to derive our regression equation for the
variance of relative prices in a dynamic optimizing model.  This equation is similar to the one17
estimated in Engel and Rogers (1996).  We use a version of the model in Devereux and Engel (1998)
for this purpose.
Finally, we link our empirical findings to Devereux and Engel’s (1998) welfare results on fixed
versus floating exchange rates.  In the model, failures of the law of one price imply welfare losses due
to an inefficiency associated with consumers in different locations paying different prices for the same
good.  Our empirical work attributes most of the failure of the law of one price to local currency
pricing and floating exchange rates.  But even if failures of the law of one price were eliminated
through fixed exchange rates, it does not necessarily eliminate the inefficiency.  Fixed exchange rates
would not eliminate the welfare loss, even though the welfare loss would no longer come from failures
of the law of one price.  Under fixed rates, the law of one price holds, but the welfare loss would come
from volatility of consumption.  It is worth emphasizing that the welfare loss (the inefficiency) is due
to price stickiness, and the choice of the exchange rate regime does not necessarily alter that.
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The optimal tradeoff between consumption and leisure is given by:
r h t t t C P W = .( A . 3 )
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 582-583; 1998, p. 38-40) show that equations (A.1) and (A.2),
combined with the random walk assumption on money supplies given in equation (2) imply nominal
interest rates are constant.  As they explain, monetary expansion at home causes home real interest
rates to fall, but causes expected inflation to rise.  When money balances enter the utility function
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A set of equations analogous to (A.1)-(A.4) hold in the foreign country.
Equation (A.4) and its foreign counterpart, along with the risk-sharing condition (6) imply:20
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Under floating exchange rates, we assume that in each country the log of the money supply
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where  t u  is an independent and identically distributed normal random variable with mean of zero and
variance of 
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A similar set of equations describe the foreign money supply process under floating exchange rates.
The foreign money supply shock, 
*
t u  is assumed to be independent of  t u  when exchange rates are
flexible.  We will assume under fixed exchange rates that monetary policies in the two countries are
perfectly harmonized, so as to keep the exchange rate fixed at unity.  This means 
*
t u  is assumed to
have a correlation of one with  t u .
Now we turn to the firms’ optimization problem.  From the intratemporal consumption choices,
we have:
t t ht ht ht C P P i P i C
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Because the production function is linear, the firm’s problem can be separated into the problem of
choosing  ) (i Pht  to maximize the discounted profits from sales domestically and choosing  ) (
* i Pht  to
maximize discounted profits from foreign sales. Substituting the above equations into the firm’s
objective function, and recalling that time t prices are in the time t-1 information set, the firm’s
objective in choosing  ) (i Pht  is to maximize:
() () )) ( 1 ( )) ( ( )) ( (
1 1
1 i k i P W i P C E t ht t ht t t + -
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-
l l r .
To choose  ) (
* i Pht , it maximizes:
() () )) ( 1 ( )) ( ( )) ( (
* * 1 * *
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Equation (A.4) shows that shocks to  t C  arise only from monetary shocks, which are assumed
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Similarly, using the analog to equation (A.4) for foreign wages, and using the risk-sharing condition
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Now note that from equation (A.4) we have
) 1 ln( c
mb r - + - = t t t p m c , (A.12)
where lower-case letters are logs of their upper-case counterparts.  Since money is log-normally
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Using equation (A.11) we can then write
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and,






























































Turning to the labor market equilibrium condition, note that  ht ht P i P = ) (  implies that
ht ht C i nC = ) (  and, similarly, 
* * ) ( ht ht C i nC = .  Equilibrium in the goods and labor market in the home
country requires:
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and in the foreign country:
ò ò
- -









* )) ( 1 )( ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) 1 ( . (A.19*)
Equation (A.19) can be written:
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Using equations (A.14) and (A.17) and the definitions in (A.16) and (A.18), we derive:24
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which can be used along with equation (A.15) to derive utility in the home country:

















Note that the derivation of utility did not depend on the correlation of domestic and monetary
shocks.  Thus, utility under fixed exchange rates does not depend on the perfect correlation of domestic
and monetary shocks.  The only modification to expression (A.20) that is needed to derive utility under
fixed exchange rate is that the simplification that 
2 2
* m m s s =  can be used.
We can further note that in the case where  2
1 = n  and 
2 2 2
* s s s º = m m , then  f h V V =  and the









































We shall also make use of the solution for goods prices.  Since  t P  is in the time t-1 information
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In writing equation (A.22) we have allowed for a slight generalization – that the shocks to
transportation costs have a conditional mean that is not constant.  So, in equation (A.22) we are using
the following notation:
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where we continue to assume that the means are identical across firms.  (We can still interpret
) 1 ln( k + = k  and  ) 1 ln(
* * k + = k  as unconditional means.  So, allowing time-varying conditional
means in transportation costs does not alter the unconditional expectation of utility given in equations
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Table 1 -- Locations of CPI Data





































Castilla y Leon (Leon)
Cataluna (Barcelona)












































Notes: The table lists the locations for our data on consumer price indexes.  In those cases in which prices are
taken from a state (as in Germany), region (as in Spain), or from the country as a whole, the city listed in
parenthesis is that used to calculate distances.  All data are monthly from 1981:3-1997:7.
Inflation rates and import-to-GDP ratios are annual averages over the period 1981-96.26
Table 2; Summary Statistics
Pairs: Variance )P(j,k) Variance )s(j,k) Distance # obs.
1-mo. 12-mo. 48-mo. 1-mo. 12-mo. 48-mo.
All 2.12 39.7 121.3 1.97 40.1 120.0 653 1485
GE-GE 0.02 0.21 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 209 15
IT-IT 0.14 0.99 2.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 263 190
SP-SP 0.23 1.01 3.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 417 153
SW-SW 0.07 0.37 1.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 80 6
intra-national 0.17 0.96 2.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 322 364
inter-national 2.76 52.3 159.8 2.62 53.1 159.0 760 1121
Notes: Columns display the mean values of the variance of changes (both 1-month, 12-month, and 48-
month changes) in the relative price between location j and k, )P(j,k), and the change in the nominal
exchange rate )s(j,k), distance (in miles), and the number of observations.  Prices are in U.S. dollars.
Listed by row is the sample of cities used in the calculations.  The first row uses city pairs in all 55
locations; GE-GE indicates that only the within-Germany city pairs are used; IT-IT, SP-SP, and SW-
SW are the analogies for the Italian, Spanish, and Swiss cities; intra-national indicates that only pairs
of cities within countries are used; and inter-national indicates that only cross-border pairs are used in
the calculations.  The data are monthly from 1981:3-1997:7.27
Table 3A; Regressions Explaining Relative Price Variability
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2 .89 .99 .99 .99
Notes:  The sample period is 1981:3-1997:7.  There are 1485 observations in each regression.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis.  The dependent variable is the variance
of the 1-month change in the log relative price.  The independent variables are:
Distance = the distance between cities in the particular pair (in miles);
Var ()s(j,k)) = the variance of the 1-month change in the nominal exchange rate;
Border = unity if the cities in the pair lie across an international border;
Adjacent = unity if there is a common border separating the city pair;
Language = unity if the cities lie in different countries that speak a common language.
Specifications 1-3 also include all 55 individual location dummies (one for each of our 49 cities and
one for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal).  Specification 4
includes all border dummies as well as all 55 individual location dummies.  Mnemonics used for the
border dummies are from the following country list: GE=Germany, SP=Spain, IT=Italy,
SW=Switzerland, FR=France, AU=Austria, BE=Belgium, DE=Denmark, LU=Luxembourg,
NE=Netherlands, and PO=Portugal.  Thus, in specification 4, for example, the dummy variable IT-SW
is unity for location pairs that lie across the Italian-Swiss border and zero for all other location pairs.  A
(*) indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.
(1) coefficients and standard error have been multiplied by 10
4;   (2) the coefficient and standard error
have been multiplied by 10
7;28
Table 3B; Regressions Explaining Relative Price Variability – 48-Month Changes
















































2 .50 .91 .99
Notes:  The sample period is 1981:3-1997:7.  There are 1485 observations in each regression.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis.  The dependent variable is the variance
of the 48-month change in the log relative price.  The independent variables are defined in Table 3.
(*) indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.
(1) coefficients and standard error have been multiplied by 10
2;   (2) the coefficient and standard error
have been multiplied by 10
529
Table 4; Analysis of the Sub-Periods
A. Summary Statistics
Variance )P(j,k) Variance )s(j,k)
Pairs: 81:3-86:12 87:12-92:7 92:11-97:7 Full 81:3-86:12 87:12-92:7 92:11-97:7 Full
All 1.59 0.77 2.27 1.78 1.24 0.40 2.06 1.25
GE-GE 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT-IT 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SP-SP 0.32 0.28 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SW-SW 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Intra-
national
0.22 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inter-
national
2.30 1.06 3.65 2.69 2.18 0.71 3.62 2.52
B.  Regressions Explaining Relative Price Variability










































2 .79 .98 .99
Notes: See notes to Table 3.  All results are for one-month changes.  The sample period for the
regressions of panel B is 1987:12-1992:7.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

















































































Figure 1: Estimated Border Coefficient vs. Exchange Rate Variability.  On the vertical axis is the
coefficient estimate on the individual border dummies in specification 3 of Table 3.  The horizontal axis





































































Figure 2: Estimated Border Coefficient vs. Import/GDP Ratio.  Along the vertical axis is the coefficient
estimate on the individual border dummies in specification 3 of Table 3.  The horizontal axis depicts the
average ratio of imports to GDP. 